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Funding children’s services 
Eva Cox 
It is now over 30 years since the original federal Child Care Act was 
passed in the dying days of the McMahon Liberal government but 
funding and policy issues are still confused and contested. Many 
more child care places exist and more funding is provided, but 
Australia still lacks an integrated national childcare system that 
recognises the importance of the early years, and the need for 
effective national policy for both early childhood care and 
education. Most of the problems are depressingly familiar, after my 
thirty-plus years of involvement in this policy area, but there are 
some worrying newer aspects. 
In the three-plus decades of public debate on funding and 
providing such services, there have been major shifts in political 
frameworks and priorities. These affect supply, quality and 
affordability, so our questions and answers need to be reframed in 
current cultural social and political frameworks. The changing 
demographic patterns, such as falling birth rates, delayed child-
bearing, increased female education and workforce participation, 
affect demand questions. The shifts in political frameworks will 
affect supply and funding.  
Universal publicly funded child care was one of the key feminist 
issues we raised in the seventies, as more women were moving into 
paid work. Our hoped-for national program of quality affordable 
care ran up against the arguments about whether women should be 
encouraged to be in paid work and pressure to retain the 
separation between education and care. Before this divide could be 
resolved, the arguments were overtaken by the 1980s change of 
political directions to neo-liberalism which diminished the role of 
the state. Child care was expanded but in a framework which shifted 
collective risks from the individual by shifting from public services 
to market forces. Commercial child care was funded by 1990 and 
the expansion of market providers was encouraged by policy 
changes after 1996.  
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Overlapping with these changes in the mid 1990s were other, 
often contradictory, ideological shifts away from the 1980s emphasis 
on encouraging self provision and private providers. This move 
signalled the ascendancy of neo-conservatism, indicated by the 
move away from smaller deregulated governments to increasing 
size, centralised controls and complex demands for accountability 
by bureaucratic requirements. The new political masters used this 
increase in interventions to promote moral agendas and neo-
conservative views. The changes are most evident in the social policy 
areas where government funding was to be directed at promoting 
conservative social positions.  
Shifting assumptions about responsibilities in care 
The original neo-liberal changes in ideological directions have left 
their mark on social and political debates by diminishing the 
demands for collective solutions to problems such as child care. 
This has resulted in policy changes which have emphasised that 
parents were customers who were responsible for purchasing 
private and individual provisions. Risks pushed back onto 
individuals translate into taking responsibilities for the ‘choices’ 
they make. Young women today see having children as a lifestyle 
choice, so deciding on what is best for the child and self is often 
surrounded by extreme anxieties about making the right decisions. 
The mantra of choice imposes on them alone the need to solve the 
apparent and actual tensions between career and carer roles. An 
interesting paradox is that having more women in senior positions 
seems to require their implementing more macho workplaces, 
because of failures to influence more family-friendly workplace 
cultures. 
Another effect of these shifts may be expressed as an individual’s 
need for evident success, which may be responsible for creating 
intensifications of effort in either, or sometimes both, paid jobs and 
parenting roles. Hours of work have increased, as have pressures on 
parents to buy expensive goods and services, creating increasing 
perceptions of the difficulties of combining work and family time.  
Men are still rarely expected to make these choices but there are 
a few more taking on the primary carer roles. When parents are 
confronted with mixed messages and short supply in care services, it 
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exacerbates their confusion rather than helping them sort out 
needed networks of support services. Their searches to find 
information and compatible care often raise high anxieties about 
the quality of care, the costs or their ability to find what they need at 
appropriate times. These changes are part of the reason why 
parents do not form an angry lobby about childcare issues but 
accept the problems as personal albeit often devastating.  
The policy mess 
Childcare funding policies in Australia tangle old fashioned 
gendered assumptions about parental rights with inappropriate 
relics of the neo-liberal frames from the last two decades of public 
policy making. Despite a century plus of public interventions into 
parenting, such as compulsory education, governments still often 
fail to recognise the public needs of children below school age. This 
stance ignores both research showing high early development needs 
and the increasing workforce participation rates of mothers with 
young children and related needs for care. There is widespread lip 
service to the data on early learning but little attempt to tackle the 
complexities of policy and funding which result in care shortages, 
quality questions and lack of access for many who need it most.  
These policy holes in the early care areas are often excused by 
the Liberal government’s claims that parents are responsible for 
making the choices that become the driver for providing services. 
This stance assumes the market will provide rather than creating 
difficulties because of its failure to respond to demand, which  
puts young children at risk of the effects of inadequate and 
inappropriate mixes of market forces and government  
‘guided’ choices.  
To understand the current mess, it is interesting to look at how 
the model of child care funding has changed. It started in 1972 with 
a policy that childcare funding should guarantee quality care in 
services by paying the salaries of qualified teachers1 in childcare 
centres. This policy was replaced a few years later by a mix of part 
funding of approved centre budgets with parental fee relief, with 
both paid to the centre. These subsidy schemes were only available 
                                                     
1 Phillip Lynch’s, Child Care Act 1972 
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to not-for-profit centres, together with capital grants, but this was 
changed by Labor in 1990 to allow parents to claim the fee relief 
component if they used commercial centres. Most of these were 
small locally based businesses but the change allowed a later move 
from community based services to businesses as the basis for care 
services. 
The 1996 abolition of the operational subsidy to not-for-profit 
centres meant that fee rebates, targeted now at parents, became the 
primary mode of subsidising care. This move basically abolished the 
relationship between the government (federal) and the centres, 
creating in effect a de facto parental voucher system, but paid after 
care is found. Another major shift was the abolition of government 
capital payments which had been available for decades to both plan 
for expansion of services and enable not-for-profit groups to build 
the needed centres in appropriate locations. The combination of 
these meant that there was no ongoing relationship between  
funder and provider, just between individual purchasers and 
increasingly corporate providers. This meant that there was now no 
control over expansion as capital was only available from the private 
sector and decisions were shifted to investors not government or 
local communities.  
These series of changes shifted any control over the centres 
from the funding body to the individual ‘customers’ who had little 
power over either the costs or distribution. Centres were often 
provided in areas with low land costs, sometimes competing with 
existing community based services which the chains hoped to drive 
out of business2. The current open-ended funding of parents has no 
planning controls as users of any accredited centre are eligible. 
Rising fee costs reflect market pressures rather than any improved 
wages or care services. Capital and shareholder pressures from 
private entrepreneurs means that centres needed to provide both 
profits and high returns on capital.  
Dealing with increases in government funded parental rebates 
just feeds into incentives to further raise fees, so gap fees may 
                                                     
2 Campbelltown LGA has excessive numbers of places with the local 
government ones being half empty as the newer centres aggressively recruit 
parents, but Marrickville has a long waiting list. So ‘market’ needs do not 
seem to generate centres where the capital costs are substantial. 
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remain high. Tight cost controls over staffing and other costs means 
that chain services meet commercial priorities, not the community 
or user needs beyond what is required to sell a place in a 
commercial service provider model. 
Some responsibility for this shift to markets can be traced back 
to some parts of our lobbying and policy tactics in the early 1980s. 
The justifications for public funding of any services had shifted 
from community needs to economic requirements. These shifting 
ideologies led some childcare advocates, myself included3, to 
change our rhetoric and demands for funding from the social 
needs of children to the economic servicing of parents on the basis 
of their workforce participation. We were responding to the 
dominance of neo-liberal policy making, so we had to convince 
governments that child care was an economic service, not just some 
fluffy, social/communal replacement for what had once been a 
more collective model of child rearing.  
This economic-based model worked well in terms of policy, as 
there was a considerable expansion of public funding for care in 
the 1980s, both capital and recurrent, but it also resulted in the 
focus shifting from services as community based to a model that 
could be, and later was, commercialised. For some reason, this shift 
has been almost unquestioned until recently with the rise of chains. 
Where these do occur, they relate more to ideological arguments 
about profit making and its possible ill effects on quality, than on 
the rights of children and parents to systems of publicly run 
community based services.  
While spending has risen, controls over services have lessened as 
funders no longer required justifications of new services or the 
budgets of existing ones. This change raises issues about the 
responsibilities of public funders of services to particularly 
vulnerable groups.4 This contrasts with the debates about allocating 
                                                     
3 As NCOSS Director in 1979 I produced a lobbying report on needs based 
child care, and as Policy Researcher for the shadow ALP Minister  prepared 
the policy for the incoming Hawke government. In 1984, I was in charge of 
NSW Child Care in the state department so I am familiar with the ethos 
and negotiations.   
4 The needs of children are widely canvassed and well summarised in K 
Press, What about the kids? Policy directions for improving the experiences 
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beds, accrediting and funding aged care and appropriate roles for 
commercial providers. Making child care a product for sale has 
created gross inequities through lack of planning, and badly 
distributed and often overpriced services, as well as questions  
about quality.  
Markets distribute on ability to pay, not equity, and have no 
morals or concerns about those with lesser capacities to pay. 
Centres which need to reduce gap fees to meet the local lower 
income ‘market’ may often do so by employing cheaper staff with 
lesser qualifications and experience. Families will limit their hours, 
or fail to use, services on the basis of costs, not on children’s needs. 
In addition, the growth of major chains means less and less 
reflection of local needs and a one size fits all bureaucratic system, 
as well as uncontrolled cost cuts and fee rises to increase profits. 
The Australia Institute study of child care (Rush 2006), and in 
particular their findings on the economies of scale operations of 
ABC Learning Centres, suggest that this form of centralised control 
will further undermine locality based services as part of networks of 
care. The process of change from the universalist-community 1970s 
expectations to new market models, could be seen as a natural 
evolution but that term would suggest the later model is an 
improvement, which it is not. 
The removal of the direct funding of centres via operational 
subsidies post 1996 started the fee spiral and the increase of 
commercial interest. A recent report from NATSEM (Cassells et al.  
2005) shows that fees rose 10.3 per cent from 2003 to 20045 and 
                                                                                                             
of infants and young children in a changing world. It details demographic 
changes and other aspects of risk for children, summarises research and 
offers critiques of policy needs. As such this paper does not repeat the 
excellent content but seeks to add funding proposals which are missing and 
some more feminist analyses of the barriers.   
5 This figure is from Affordability and Availability in Australia: what the 
HILDA Survey tells us Rebecca Cassells, Justine McNamara, Rachel Lloyd 
and Ann Harding. Paper presented at the 9th Australian Institute of Family 
Studies Conference, Melbourne 10 February 2005. Figure 9 in this paper 
illustrates how the introduction of the Child Care Cash Rebate on 1 July 
1994 is marked by a slight decrease in prices at this point in time. Prices 
then rise by around 42 per cent from December 1994 to June 2000, 
followed by a sharp decrease after the introduction of the new Child Care 
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substantially more over the period of the Liberal government’s 
changes. While these changes have saved governments the costs of 
capital, the costs to parents have risen substantially and led to poor 
allocation of capital in many areas. 
A neo-conservative mousetrap? 
The neo-liberal models in this area are based on two basic 
assumptions: that markets are the best distributors of services and 
that informed rational ‘customer’ choices would ensure quality. 
Where customers lack resources to purchase, the role of the state is 
to fund the customer, so they can purchase the service. This model 
is driven by assumptions of informed rational self interest, 
autonomously determined, and defending one’s own best interests. 
Policies in this category can be via vouchers or, more commonly in 
Australia, by offering subsidies or rebates directly to users to defray 
part of the costs. This mode of operating limits the contact or 
contract possibilities between service and funding body, but may 
rely on some form of accreditation or quality assurance. It is 
supported by those who promote little or no role for the state (Vern 
Hughes 2006). 
Interestingly, the federal government itself does not use this 
funding model in many other areas of service because it doesn’t 
work in situations of vulnerability and scarce services. Person-based 
subsidies too easily become cash flows for services which can raise 
their costs to the maximum the customer can afford, particularly 
when the service is in short supply, as happened in nursing homes 
some years ago. The contrast here between childcare centres and 
nursing homes is interesting as the latter are both relatively heavily 
regulated and monitored and offer a controlled model of funding 
services to people. 
There are many other services such as those for newly arrived 
immigrants, the unemployed and families at risk which reflect an 
alternative funding model that is the product of more recent 
ideological conversion of markets by neo-conservative drivers. The 
shift is to a purchase of services contract model that no longer 
                                                                                                             
Benefit in July 2000. The price of child care experiences a fall of over 21 
per cent from July 2000 to September 2001. Prices then start to climb 
steeply from this point onwards. 
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funds organisations to offer their services, but contracts to ‘buy’ 
very clearly specified services from NGOs and businesses, often 
defining in fine detail how the federal government expects ‘best 
practice’ to operate.  
This Taylorisation reduces services to assembly line components 
and creates other problems as its defined reportable outputs means 
the growth of one size fits all models. This creates two types of 
problems: one is that such contracts may fail to recognise provider 
expertise, diverse needs and other differences that services require 
to meet client needs. The other problem is that the bureaucratic 
funding bodies may be predisposed to select as contractors large 
bureaucratic agencies that have similar cultures to their own which 
may be either large corporate chains like ABC Learning Centres or 
the larger charities like Mission Australia that follow corporate 
administrative models.  
These agencies are then tied to a centrally devised government-
knows-best model of what is assumed that people need. 
Underpinning such service contracts are assumptions that such 
agencies have to be policed to deliver adequately on public money. 
This model contrasts with the lack of control of the child care 
example above so the spectrum goes from overvaluing the power of 
consumers to lack of trust in everyone! Neither extreme seems to 
understand the need for funding policies to be based on mutual 
respect of expertise, recognition of diverse consumer based needs 
or judicious mixes of accountability and trust. In both cases, there 
are increasing possibilities for commercial operators but very 
different assumptions about policing them. 
These models of funding make interesting contrasts on the 
criteria of trust and accountability. In the case of childcare funding, 
the parent is assumed to be an adequate arbiter of quality with the 
support of relatively limited state regulations and a not too 
demanding accreditation system. In the latter directed funding 
model, the federal government appears to trust no one but their 
own contract enforcement models. Neither type of funding 
encourages the development of relationships, social networks and 
the types of connections that are built through trust which can lead 
to the development of social capital communalities that create 
resilience and increase capacities for good parenting and care.  
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The logic of mixing autonomy and control 
I am proposing a funding system which draws some aspects from 
both the above models but starts from the assumption that the child 
is the focal point of the services on offer. Parents are the primary 
carers and should have the capacities to choose those services they 
feel best meet their children’s and own needs, and influence how 
they are run. However, they cannot be assumed to have the skills 
and know how to negotiate price and access in an open, sparse 
‘market’. Parents lack the ‘perfect knowledge’ and resources to 
bargain for optimum outcomes so they need to have more 
assistance through government guarantees of both financial 
accessibility and quality of care. At the same time, services need to 
be given the capacity to use both the skills of staff and user inputs to 
craft appropriate services to meet diverse and local needs, so 
centralised controls must be limited.  
The main change I am recommending is that a substantial part 
of federal government funding would be switched to funding a 
proportion of the costs of individual centres, not chains. These 
centres would be required to sign service contracts including an 
agreed budget, quality related staffing ratios and an agreed fee 
structure. This type of change would result in flattening the ‘playing 
field’ by limiting the ability of centres to charge excessive fees and 
requiring acceptable standards of staffing that related to their 
population mix. Other items could include requirements for 
parental/community advisory committees for each centre and 
centre obligations to be part of local interagency groups. This 
policy assumes that governments, in return for directly funding 30 
per cent of the costs of care, can require centres to both comply 
with certain requirements in terms of services offered and to peg 
fees at an acceptable level. This would mean more equitable fees 
and spending on appropriately qualified staff. Centres will no 
longer be able to set their own fees, but would be required like 
nursing homes to have caps on fees where a subsidy is received.  
The funding would have two parts: a proportion of an agreed 
budget goes to the centre as a core subsidy with a top up that is 
related to specific parental incomes to make their care affordable. 
This recognises differing costs for centres to ensure staff quality and 
numbers to deal with difficult children, poverty issues, or the higher 
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costs of care for toddlers and children with disabilities. The 
approved budget should also allow for a return on capital, where 
this is not publicly provided, and an agreed profit margin.  
This model would re-establish direct relationships between 
centres and the funding body, with the contract acting as a form of 
cost control over the rest of the sector. Reversing the focus on 
markets and recognising that public subsidies of services require 
different forms of accountability may mean children get the services 
they need during their major learning period.  
Why only centres? 
I am focusing on centre-based care services because these should be 
the core of the formal services offered and should be the access 
point for home based and parental support services. The reasons 
that child care is required are complex and most families make a 
range of informal and formal relationships through these 
arrangements. Centres can play a broader role in ensuring that 
children are embedded in familiar networks of adults and other 
children. Parents need access to formally available services as back 
up for informal networks to cover time demands when children 
need more stability and skills. Centre based services can, like 
schools, become central to the lives of children and their families.  
Centres should offer more than services based on the time 
within the centre, such as access to skill sharing and links with other 
parents and centre staff so that positive and creative relationships 
can be formed. While parents should have the right to just drop off 
and pick up children from care services, effective services need to 
involve the whole family in seeing the centre as integral to their 
lives. It should develop links that can encompass services such as 
Family Day Care and outreach services that make for communities 
of common interest between all those concerned with the 
children’s care. 
Is this model of funding a problem?  
Some current advocates for care have seen this proposal as 
retrograde or too alien to present funding models. My view is that 
we need to learn from what worked and to recognise that the neo-
liberal model is passé and the proposal fits with some aspects of the 
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shifts in frameworks that are taking place. The use by neo-
conservatives of the rhetoric of choice, underpinning the present 
policy settings, is deeply gendered. By defining the use of child care 
as parental choice driven, it becomes pressure on vulnerable 
women to conform with ‘tradition’ that is, assumptions of 
particularities of the virtues of staying with children and solo 
mother-child bonding. It is often those who have real choices about 
returning to paid work who can and do make free choices about 
paid and unpaid work unaffected by powerful expectations of good 
mothering. For many others, it is still difficult for them to say, or 
even think, that they actually want time away from a young child. 
The popular promotion of writers such as Manne (2006) and 
Biddulph (2006) indicate continuing levels of antagonism to 
‘institutionalising’ child care and mothers taking time away from 
young children. 
These ambivalences are still evident in most public policy 
makers and inhibit the capacity to have a proper debate about the 
need for more public provision of early childhood services, except 
where children are seen to be at risk. This viewpoint can reinforce 
individuated child rearing as the best lifestyle choice, which 
removes the option of discussing the possibilities of collective care. 
This assumption sits relatively comfortably with the new 
conservative debates on parenting and care, making it easier to 
understand why policies that promote publicly funded communal 
care are not part of the public policy vocabulary, despite the higher 
workforce participation of mothers with children aged 0–4 years.  
The current policies in the Australian context mean increasing 
inequalities among young children. Those parents with resources 
have chosen to, and been able to, engage outside resources to 
ensure that their children receive early group involvement and 
learning. Children with less resourced families were less likely to use 
forms of care, unless they were targeted as disadvantaged. Even 
though the growth of child care services in the 1980s and 1990s 
promoted wider use, recent increases in fees means this has now 
become an unaffordable option for many families6.  
                                                     
6 Recent surveys including Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006, Child Care, 
Australia, cat. no. 4402.0, ABS, Canberra, see many parents quoting costs as 
a barrier or limit on use of care 
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The studies often quoted that indicate possible problems with 
use of care services ignore local evidence that young children do 
not spend long periods in centre type care, as their primary carer is 
generally working part time and/or use other informal family based 
care. The baby in 50-plus hours of centre care per week7 is neither 
the norm nor common. As statistics show, 80 per cent of children in 
day care use it for less than 30 hours per week, 47 per cent use it for 
less than 10 hours. Only 9 per cent of primary carers are working 
full time and most use family care options. Only 7 per cent of 
children under one are in formal care and overall only 7 per cent of 
children use formal care for more than 35 hours per week  
(ABS 2005).  
Many of the scaremongers fail to acknowledge that children are 
parented for most of the time when young. They also ignore the 
difficulties that may occur in some families because of the lack of 
other resources to make parenting easier, for example, paid 
maternity leave and the right to work part time. However, just 
making employers more accepting of parental flexibility needs will 
not solve the problems of their finding care for the times that they 
are actually still in the workplace.  
Despite many research reports, academic papers and media 
discussion of the problems and need for change, there seems to be 
blockages that prevent concerted lobbying for particular solutions. 
How far is this inaction the result of ambivalences in this area and 
fear of offending the holders of more traditional viewpoints? Is this 
an example of what Jennifer Sumsion sees as ‘Bauman’s collective 
impotence that stops policy action’? 8 Her article, and many others, 
outlines the policy issues very clearly but there is a need to do more 
by both challenging the market models and offering alternative 
funding that would both increase care and make the sector a less 
attractive source of profits. This has been my task in the hope of 
urging us to find agreement on specifics and then work out how to 
lobby effectively for the needed changes.  
                                                     
7 Many overseas studies use this time usage as a yardstick  
8 J. Sumsion 2006, From Whitlam to economic rationalism and beyond , 
AECA, 
http://www.earlychildhoodaustralia.org.au/australian_journal_of_early_ch
ildhood/ajec_index_abstracts/whitlam_to_economic_rationalism.html.  
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Actual proposals 
Formal childcare services need to offer parents and children access 
to skilled and valued staff, resources, space, and flexibility. We need 
to ensure that there is easy access to these services at affordable 
prices. Parents and children using a good centre do more than use 
the services; they become part of a community, making links with 
other adults and children that may also become part of their lives 
outside the centre. The costs they are asked to meet must be 
affordable and cover the use of the optimum hours. Access must be 
within a reasonable timeframe from the time of seeking the service.  
Funding formulae for centres must be able to solve the following 
problems with the current system: 
 
1. The childcare rebate bears no relationship to actual 
childcare costs in particular centres or particular mixes of 
services, so once fees exceed the maximum subsidy, the 
‘gap’ fee must be met by the parent.  
2. This one-size-fits-all formula makes no allowance for the 
differences in the costs of providing care for babies and 
children, or developmental needs that require more 
experienced/trained staff to assist children who need 
professional interventions. 
3. Centres, particularly in low income areas, may cut costs  
as much as possible to limit the gap fees by using  
less experienced, less qualified people which may  
disadvantage those children who often have needs for a 
higher level of expertise. 
4. The prevalence of chain commercial centres, which need to 
make a profit, offers cost contained models that may not 
allow time for, or encourage, development of social and 
community links.  
5. While there are some conditions placed on eligibility for fee 
relief, standards remain at state based minimal not 
optimum standards, except for a federal accreditation 
system which has no effective monitoring and some flaws.  
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6. Additional payments to parents such as the tax rebate or 
other possible tax measures and subsidies will again allow 
centres to raise their fees. 
7.  Demand in this area does not seem to stimulate supply as 
land costs etc. are used as a base for investment by 
commercial operators rather than local needs.  
8. Staff wage rises are badly needed to contain turnover  
and ensure quality but are not taken into account in  
the funding, setting up tensions between parents and 
providers.  
9. State funded centres such as those in NSW are under-
funded and chaotic and need urgent reviews on both 
funding and needs for support and supervision. 
Proposed solutions 
The following proposals differ from most of the current floated 
proposals because they focus on directly funding centres on the 
basis of an agreed contract so that both quality and fees can be 
controlled. These contracts that allow flexibility to meet specific 
centre based needs would be contingent on the centres being 
accredited and being in areas where there is demand for centres. 
• Each centre should be required to submit a budget and 
fee schedule. If approved, it should be then funded to a 
certain proportion of the costs, say 30 per cent, as a basic 
subsidy to allow for the fee levels below. 
• Funding submissions by the centre should articulate what 
staffing levels they require to meet children’s needs for 
experience and qualifications in care settings.  
• Centres should generally be expected to stick to their 
budgets for the agreed services. Where parents raise 
additional money for additional services, these must  
not be raised by compulsory levies or pressured additional 
payments.  
• Centres should submit their budget on a break even level, 
with a margin of 5 per cent profit on capital investment to 
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cover development of services or profit. Centres which are 
privately funded will get reasonable ‘rent’ on capital 
resources used.  
• Centres should acquit their budgets annually, show what 
has been collected and spent and adjustments made for 
underspending or legitimate overspending. 
• Capital grants must be made available through a joint 
federal/state agreement for new community centres and 
upgrading old ones, possibly 50/50 for buildings with the 
state offering land parcels (see 1980s model).  
• All centres would be required to have a 
parental/community committee to make decisions on 
staffing, activities and programs. 
• All centres should be required to make links with  
local communities and related services as a condition  
of funding.  
• Family day care should be linked to centres so they can 
both gain support and become part of service choices for 
meeting children’s needs.  
• Out of school care should also keep links with centres and 
be funded in ways which allow flexibility and optimum 
centre usage. Services should receive a grant for 
operations on similar lines to the early childhood centres. 
• These centres would also submit a budget and estimate 
the fees to be charged and be able to adjust the funding 
according to a formula which limits the maximum fee to 
for example, $12 per day maximum with minimum of $1.  
• All service should be funded for specialist and high  
skilled staff to ensure that children are able to access  
particular types of activities that enhance their social and 
physical competencies.  
Services run for shorter hours, that is, the classic preschools, should 
receive subsidies for fee relief matching those in long day care 
centres where these are required in designated areas of 
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disadvantage and there is no universally available state funded 
preschool. In return for such funding , these should (and some do) 
offer more flexible and extended hours to meet parental needs and 
child needs. These services should be sufficiently accessible to be 
able to meet the time requirements and financial limits of both 
those in and out of paid work. 
Other types of services, such as home based care for sick 
children should be associated with centre based services so children 
can be allocated to services that best meet their needs, as well as 
those of their parents. This would also allow for use of multiple 
services to meet needs like shift work, for example, family day care 
plus centre based care. 
Fee relief 
• A top up income tested additional subsidy will be offered 
to lower income parents to reduce their costs. 
• The formula to be developed should set a maximum gap 
fee for parents, for example at 8 per cent of the minimum 
wage (about $38 per day), and additional subsidies on the 
basis of parental income can be claimed either by parent 
or centre with a minimum fee of $5 per day.  
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